Towards a phenomenology of pain and suffering: a reflection on Max Scheler’s phenomenology of pain and suffering

Nothing seems to be more difficult to conceptualise than pain and suffering. In pain and suffering, one discovers oneself in one's grieving solitude, loneliness, and speechlessness. The wordless solitude of pain and suffering confirms that while pain cannot be thought, pain obliges us to think. The celebrated verse of Aisquilos' Agamemnon

\[
Ton \ pathei \ mathos \ thenta \ kurios \ ekei
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Men shall learn wisdom, by affliction schooled

sees pain and suffering as the tragical source of knowledge. Since the time of the ancient Greeks, pain and experience, \textit{pathei-mathei}, has expressed what we can call the paradox of pain: what cannot be thought obliges us to think.

The word used by Sophocles for pain and suffering is \textit{pathei}, an aorist form of the verb \textbullet\textbullet\textbullet\textbullet, to suffer. The Latin word \textit{passio}, passion in English, also derives from this verb. Passion can be regarded as the main Western term for pain and suffering. In the great majority of Indo-European languages, we can observe a semantic ambiguity in the use of the word passion. Passion expresses, on the one hand, passivity for instance when one is affected by something. On the other hand, passion is also understood as displeasure, pain and grief for instance when we talk about the passion of Christ. Passion means both the opposite of activity and the opposite of pleasure. Passion is, therefore, conveyed by negativities and negations. Because every feeling exposes affection, in the sense of being affected or being touched, feeling is determined in the light of the passive voice. That is why pain and suffering are the main semantic axes of all passion.

The semantic ambiguity of the word "passion" has influenced the different philosophical attempts to define the philosophical problem of pain and suffering. These different approaches are indecisive about whether pain should be distinguished from suffering; whether pain should be understood from the point of view of suffering or suffering
from the point of view of pain; or whether the moral sense of pain should be based on the physiology of pain or vice-verse. In relation to these questions, the text of Max Scheler, *Vom Sinn des Leides, About the Sense of Pain*, is an important contribution to the phenomenology of pain and passion. The fundamental position of Scheler, in his own words, is that "the origin and the foundation of increasing pain is the resistance to evil" (Scheler, 1963, 401). To understand what is meant by resisting evil it is important not only to understand Scheler’s philosophical position but also to attempt to develop a phenomenology of pain and suffering. In this sense, the paradox of pain - what cannot be thought obliges us to think - becomes a starting point for pursuing the philosophical question of evil. My aim is to reflect on some of the structures discussed by Scheler in his attempts to formulate a phenomenology of pain and suffering.

Scheler’s text, *Vom Sinn des Leides*, was first published in 1916 as part of *Krieg und Aufbau*. In his posthumous manuscripts there are anterior and posterior notes to the published text. In a supplement, *Zu einer philosophischen Lehre von Schmerz und Leide* (Scheler, 1963), Scheler outlines the contents of his projected work on the philosophical doctrine of pain and suffering as follows:

a) a teleological doctrine of every kind of sensation of displeasure since displeasure awakens and invites various actions and reactions;

b) the axiology and ethics of suffering, of individual suffering and its social forms such as compassion, dissimulation and explication of feelings;

c) the psychotechnique of suffering, that is, a reflection about various techniques in order to face voluntary pain and suffering;

d) a doctrine about the variable balance between pleasure and displeasure both from the point of view of the biological evolution of species and the historical evolution of mankind;

e) a metaphysical interpretation of the universal sense of suffering in the world process in relation to the foundation/profundity of the world.

As a phenomenologist, Scheler adheres to the main phenomenological issue about moods and affection, namely that affections are meaning structures (*Sinn*) and not the opposite of sense and signification. In other words, pain and suffering are not facts, empirical data or biological reflexes but the genesis of meaning. Affection and feelings are phenomenologically not the opposite of meanings but meaning structures at their source. The distinction made by Kant between *Empfindung* (sensibility) and *Gefühl* (feeling) is, from the
point of view of phenomenology, ungrounded. Kant defines *Empfindung* (sensibility) as the capacity to be affected by external things and *Gefühl* (feeling) as subjective feeling, independent of the object. This distinction is phenomenologically ungrounded because it identifies consciousness with rationality. Redefined as intentionality, consciousness does not coincide entirely with rational consciousness. All rationality is conscious, that is, intentional but all intentionality is not rational-cognitive consciousness. From a phenomenological point of view, the physico-biology of passion cannot be disconnected from the grammar of its presentation. When someone says, ‘I cannot go further because I cannot stand the pain,’ or ‘the pain in my foot is a pain in my whole body’, ‘I am blinded with pain,’ it means that pain itself cannot be separated from not being able to stand the pain. Pain itself cannot be dissociated from the blindness of pain. Irrationality is therefore not pain but the very attempt to distinguish the sensation of pain from the subjective feeling of pain. Not standing the pain is the same time as the pain itself. Blinded by pain is the same time as the pain itself. This impossibility to dissociate the fact and the feeling shows not only the particularity of pain and suffering but also the universal structure of meaning as such. The English meaning of the word meaning is quite unlike the German multi-significance of the word *Sinn*. *Sinn* means meaning, direction, sense, sensibility and feelings, all at the same time. *Sinn* is the very phenomenological expression of the complex world of life and its being alive. Scheler defines *Gefühl*, feeling, as life (Scheler, 1963, 331) in so far as *Gefühl* is the source of meaning. In order to understand pain and suffering it is, therefore, important to follow Scheler’s definition of life as *Gefühl*, feeling, understood as the source of the complexity of meaning.

Accordingly to Scheler, life is a teleological structure. By life, he means a *telos*, a *Sinn*, including the various senses of direction, feeling, sense and sensibility. Life is a teleological structure not because there may be an external meaning or sense to life but because life gives birth to meaning, meaning therefore birth. Scheler defined life not simply as *Gefühl*, feeling, but as "the profound dimension of feeling" (*Tiefendimension des Gefühles*), a "profound layer of feeling", (*Tiefenschichten des Gefühles*) (Scheler, 1963, 331). Life is for Scheler the complex life of profundity. Profundity is the action of getting deeper, of reaching the 'foundation', the depth of life. That is why to live means to get more and more into the depth of life even if one lives trying to escape more and more from the profundity of life (Scheler, 1963, 331). The different degrees or layers of profundity in life express life's teleological structure as intensification. Life itself intensifies passing from mere body to life-
body, from life-body to the unity of life, from the unity of life to the soul, from the soul to the
spirit. Scheler’s position is essentially in line with Nietzsche’s philosophy and that is why he
admits that, "all feelings - Gefühle - both positives and negatives are at the same time signs of
an increase in values and non-values" (Scheler, 1963, 332). Life does not mean to conserve
but to intensify or deepen. However, intensification does not mean perseverance in life
because to intensify implies a deep experience of abandonment. Life intensifies when one
abandons different levels of vitality in order to give oneself to a life even more alive, to a life
even more total. But this is only possible through negativity. This is even the point where
Scheler criticizes Spinozism. To abandon something in order to give oneself describes the
structure from which pain and suffering are to be conceived. From this dimension, Scheler
defines the phenomenon of pain suggesting that: every pain is the pain of growth (Scheler,
1963, 46).

The pain of growth is assumed to be the pain of birth. Life is the intensity of birth. The
conceptual basis that permits the definition of every pain as the pain of growth or birth is
the relation between the part and the whole. Pain is the pain of growth in so far as growth is
understood as the abandonment of the part in giving oneself to the whole, that is to the life of
totality, to the totality of life. Every pain, says Scheler, is pain "from the part toward the
whole and pain toward the realization of a more elevated value…" (Scheler, 1963, 333). Pain
is pain-from and pain-toward.

Scheler is a phenomenologist not afraid of metaphysics. His discussion about the
"meaning of pain" gives us, in a very Nietzschean manner, the possibility to identify the tragic
origin of the concepts of the part and the whole, genos and eidos, which represent the
metaphysical vocabulary about life. Scheler’s discussion about the relation between the part
and the whole can be read in relation to Antigone. Antigone exposes the tragic existential
origin of these concepts as the experience that the life and death of an individual puts at stake
the life and death of the species. In the biology of life, every being that is born is absolutely
distinct from the others although it he/she originates from other human beings. The fact that
he/she was born from others cannot be disconnected from the fact that every individual is
born and dies alone, and that every individual has his/her own destiny. Antigone shows that
not being born alone and dying alone constitutes an entirety that should be understood in its
entireness. Each birth not only assures the continuity of the species but, at the same time, the
appearance of a radical singularity that is in itself the discontinuity of the species. Scheler’s
view is very close to Georges Batailles' book on eroticism. A species can only continue to live
by means of the birth of an individual that is, at the same time, the discontinuity of the
species. In Scheler’s words, "the individual death represents the fact that if the singular would not die life would die" (Scheler, 1963, 45). The continuity of life consists of the cyclic movement of living and dying. Life does not find continuity when all singular beings are born and continue to live but in the fact that every singular being lives and dies, breaking down, in this way, the continuity of life. In this tragic biology of life, the birth and death of the singular being is at the same time the continuity and the discontinuity of life (the species). Death, the abandonment of existence understood as discontinuity and, therefore, as the very singularity of each one, means to give oneself to the totality of the world of life. Death and pain are tragic because the question of tragedy is always the question of the world of life, as Scheler remarks in his essay Zum Phänomen des Tragischen. To live vividly means to give oneself to the totality of the life of the world and not to conserve life or persevere in being. To win would be to loose the obsession with self, letting the world of life live in oneself.

The transition from the part to the whole as the pain of growth and birth defines pain on the basis of the tragic biology of life. Scheler understands pain as "Tod im Kleinen" (Scheler, 1963, 44), as micro-death. Pain and death "are alike" because growth and birth are already death in the sense of being the discontinuity of the continuity of life when life gives birth to the unique, to the solitude of a non-transferable destiny. At stake is the simultaneity of life and death which exposes itself in the non-passing of the continual passing from life to death. In Scheler’s words, "verlieren und gewinnen sind identische," (Scheler, 1963, 47) "to win and to loose are identical". If it were possible to overcome the "eternal" passage from life to death, that is life itself, what would be surpassed would be the life of life and not simply the life of the species.

Scheler defines pain further as the configuration of togetherness (Verbandsbildung) (Scheler, 1963, 44). This means to configure a connection and not a separation from the part to the whole. Pain is not the pain of getting away but the pain of coming together. The tragic basis of Scheler’s philosophy of pain and suffering can be described as non-Aristotelean teleology. To Aristotle, there is always a meaning to the pain and suffering of living beings, at least an objective meaning, insofar as every type of pleasure or displeasure expresses an acceptance or a refusal, a yes or a no, absorption or a rejection of life, impelling the living being to act or react. The sensation of displeasure, of pain, means living beings refuse, say no. The sensation of pleasure, of joy, means living beings accept, absorb, say yes. However, to Scheler, pain is distinct from displeasure. Pain is not the lack of something but it imposes itself by itself. Pain expresses the excess of forces rather than the lack of something. Every pain is ‘too much,’ and is ‘more than I can stand.’ Furthermore, pain
is not simply a result of chance or intrusion of external circumstances. Scheler interprets "pain in a pure state" on the basis of the definitive and defining experience of tragedy where the discontinuity of the singular being, the non-transferable facticity of each life constitutes the only togetherness with the species, tragically understood as the totality of life. Primo Levi’s question, "Why is everyday pain translated so constantly into our dreams, in the ever repeated scene of the un-listened to story?" (Primo Levi, 1996, 60) pronounces the experience that in its pure state pain exposes the intransferability of the facticity of every individual’s life. When Scheler disconnects pain and suffering from displeasure, he abandons the biological understanding of life. By doing this, Scheler intends to de-biologize life. To de-biologize life means to humanize life. But humanizing life should not be confused with antropomorphizing life. On the contrary, to humanize life means to disclose the tragic basis of life. The essence of tragedy is to be conceived as Hölderlin profoundly showed within the paradox, "Everything that is originary manifests itself not in the originary force but above all in its weakness and this in such a way that to the light of life and manifestation belongs in a proper and opportune way the weakness of every whole" (Hölderlin, 1961, 274). In the same way that the continuity of the whole of life can only happen within the discontinuity of the facticity of every individual life, it is in human life that this tragic law of life manifests itself most acutely. In human life, pain is always too sharp, too acute. Human life, as Scheler says, is nothing but "a tremendous plasticity" (eine ungeheuere Plastizität) (Scheler, 1976, 151). Far from a living-thing in the universe, human life exists "on a direction of the movement of the universe, of its foundation/profundity"(Scheler, 1976, 151). Human life is the eye of life looking at itself and therefore it is in human life that it becomes mostly manifest that the facticity of the unique is the condition for the totality of life. If pain is death in miniature (microdeath), human life is tragedy in miniature (microtragedy). Scheler’s phenomenology of pain and suffering has a deep resonance with Nietzsche’s expression - Mensch-Schmerz - in its philosophical exactness. In human life, the discontinuity of the part as the condition for the whole of life is the whole life of man. Human life is pure facticity, the non-transferable destiny of loosing when winning and winning when loosing. Therefore, to humanize life does not mean to reduce the totality of life to human life but to dimension human life from the point of view of the tragic sense of the totality of the world of life.

Abandoning the connexion between pain and displeasure, Scheler abandons above all the traditional metaphysics of affection and passion, which structures philosophical thought.

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from Aristotle to Schopenhauer. The understanding of pain and suffering as lack of pleasure defines what Scheler called the "betrayal of joy," "der Verrat der Freude" (Scheler, 1963). In this betrayal, every affect, every passion, is defined as a threat to thought because it threatens the belief in the autonomy of existence. The belief in the autonomy of existence constitutes the strongest metaphysical basis upon which the understanding of life as conservation and perseverance is sustained. Scheler considers the Spinozean doctrine of affects as confused thoughts and his doctrine of being as perseverare in esse, as connatus, another example of the metaphysical betrayal of joy. To admit existence as subsistence, as the intensifying perseverance in being means to want more being and to try to eliminate not being, negativity and death from the horizon of being. According to this Spinozean position, pain is displeasure or suffering resulting from the intrusion of an external circumstance even when pain comes from the inside. Pain from the inside is as inadequate as pain caused from the outside because pain means an intrusion on the belief of the autonomy of existence. Therefore, every pain is metaphysically a kind of ontological leviathan. Affection and passion are negative in this metaphysical Spinozean way of thinking because they seem to deny the autonomy of existence, the understanding of being as subsistence, as substance. Spinozism seems to contradict the traditional philosophical underestimation of pleasure. But in fact, it reinforces it. Pleasure was traditionally undervalued because it seemed to make existence even less free than in the state of displeasure. In fact, what is at stake is neither pleasure nor displeasure but the philosophical struggle for sustaining the belief in the autonomy of existence.

For Scheler, the fundamental mistake here is the supposition that happiness and joy are considered as the finality of life. There is a law of the spirit, says Scheler, accordingly to which there are things that do not appear precisely when they become a conscious finality. These things are joy and pain, and happiness and unhappiness. The more we try to escape from pain the more pain seems to reach us. The more we seek joy, the more joy seems to get away from us. Zenon’s paradox expresses more than the aporetic geometry of reason; it expresses the tragic aporia of life itself. Far from a supposition about the finality of life, pain and joy are, as Scheler shows, sources of life. Passion is a source. Passion is not a finality of the will.

The confusion between source and finality which supports the metaphysical doctrine of emotion and passion and, therefore, of pain and suffering can be described as the confusion between the medial and passive voice of passion. In Greek grammar, the medial voice is the one concerning the simultaneity of touching and being touched, of doing and being done, of
acting and suffering an action. Scheler does not use the expression medial voice nor the grammatical metaphor that corresponds to it. Rather, Scheler talks in terms of the simultaneity of a yes and a no. Even if we cannot fully understand the consequences of this simultaneity, we can see that the simultaneity of yes and no intends to show that passion is not simply to suffer an action but to be touched when touching, to touch when being touched. Passion, pathos, pathei is nothing more, and nothing less than this simultaneity. This same verbal simultaneity defines the impossibility of separating the feeling pain from the meaning of pain. The subjectivity of pain and seeking to objectify pain are always simultaneous. It becomes therefore impossible - that is irrational - to try to disconnect the feeling of pain from the meaning of pain and the pain of meaning. It is impossible to say: first I feel pain, then I try to find a meaning for the pain. The clearest expression of this impossibility of separation is the fact of not being able to say a word when pain is acute. Crying and screaming are not beyond meaning. Screaming is the very impossibility of separating the subjectivity of pain from its objectivity. Every acute pain is wordless, is speechless but precisely in its taciturnity more manifest, more expressive than any word. In the experience of acute pain, the impossibility of explaining pain makes it apparent that feeling pain and giving meaning to pain are one and the same.

The simultaneity of touching when being touched and being touched when touching, exposes pain as beyond the dichotomy of activity and passivity. This point is decisive for Scheler. Suffering pain is not the passivity of suffering an action of something intrusive which comes from the inside or from outside. Suffering pain can be defined as a non-activity or if we prefer as passive activity and active passivity. What Scheler leaves unsaid about pain and suffering is that suffering pain - pathei, pathos - is the experience of a non-transitive transition, of a non-passing of a passage. The descriptions of suffering pain in terms of stretching, straining, ripping attunes pain to another dimension of exerting to the utmost or beyond, where something breaks down and even breaks through. I would say that pain is the ontology of a non-passing of a passage. That is why, pain, even when lasting one minute, is always almost eternal. The temporality of pain is the stretching of the temporality of the meanwhile. The spatiality of pain represents compressing spatiality where the skin becomes smaller than flesh. The compressing-stretching frame of pain manifests pain as the acute experience of the non-transition of a transition, of a “Meanwhile”.

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Pain is the pain of growth in as far as pain is pain from the part to the whole. From the part to the whole means from the intensity of life to the intensification of life in life. That is why pain and suffering touch human beings with the metaphysical touch of pain. Scheler distinguishes different levels of pain. Feelings bound to sensation, vital feelings, feelings bound to the consciousness of self, and metaphysical spiritual feelings do not define different kinds of pain, pain that is more or less essential. The distinction in levels of pain proposed by Scheler pretends to show the “percussive” character of pain and suffering. No pain is pain on only one level. Every pain mobilizes the variable dimensions of being touched by the world, either as a biological life, a singular and personal existence, or a spiritual experience of self-overcoming. That is why for Scheler not even the most empirical biology of life can consider that physical pain is not conditioned by cultural, social, historical and symbolic factors (Rey, 1993). To accept pain, to give into pain, to silence pain in for instance states of apathy, to justify pain (pain is punishment), heroic struggles to surmount pain, illusions of facing pain, hedonism and asceticism, optimism and pessimism, heroism and cynicism, all these ways of dealing with pain show that being affected by pain, at the same time, affects the world with pain. To accept or to refuse, to fight to win, or to not fight allowing oneself to be defeated, these ways of activity and passivity understand pain as a lack of pleasure, denying what is most fundamental to pain, namely, the tremendous encounter with the definitive and defining facticity of life and death. "My" pain and "my" death give life to the totality of life. The dry lives in the desert do not differ so much from the extremely cold lives in the steppe when we observe that the lack of water in the desert and the excess of water in the steppe illustrate the tragic law that determines the vital mortal relation between the part and the whole. Both the dry and the excess of life are, in their tremendous pain, still life. The experience of this tragic law is for Scheler the sacrifice. That is why Scheler affirms that, "every construction and state of things bound to the world of pain, of suffering and to the evil of death can only be understood and can only sustain a metaphysical meaning in the light of only one thought: the thought of sacrifice" (Scheler, 1963, 40, 46). Accordingly to Scheler, the fact that in situations of complete distress and degradation in war, even in extreme situations where what is at stake is the unlimited indifference toward life and death, the fact that testimonies of pain can even testify that there still is life, shows that only the thought of sacrifice is able to understand pain. From the point of view of Scheler’s phenomenology of pain and suffering, sacrifice means the discovery that pain is a source, that pain is not the betrayal of joy but the fidelity of joy. In Scheler’s theory of sacrifice we, undoubtedly, recognize his Nietzschean Christianity. To expand on what constitutes this Christianity is a task that surpasses our present aim.
Nevertheless, it is important to observe that, seen as the pain of growth and birth, pain is not opposed to joy. Pain and joy are sources if they are not confused with pleasure or displeasure. Pain and joy dwell in the dimension of what we could call the ‘antigony’ of life or even the nerve of life. Pain and joy occur when life is exposed in the same sense we talk about 'exposed flesh'. In my native language, Portuguese, the expression 'carne viva' means more or less 'flesh alive'. The ontological condition of pain and joy pronounces itself in the impulsivity of life, in the impetuosity for surpassing life itself, for abandoning different levels of life in order to reach a more total life. Therefore, the ontological condition of pain and joy for Scheler is Eros, the obscure light of the force of Eros, in Scheler’s words, "the force of every togetherness (space) and of every procreation (time)" (Scheler, 1963, 45). Only when life is exposed as flesh can pain and joy touch themselves. Only then do pain and joy expose life as a tremendous search for simultaneity. In the deep dimensions of the soul, says Scheler, we feel at the same time the positive and the negative. At this silent moment in which life is exposed, pain and joy discover the experience that what unites can disunite and what disunites can even unite.

Scheler’s phenomenology of pain and suffering is based on a transformation of the philosophical meaning of affect, passion and feeling. Feeling is a source of meaning and not something which has to find a meaning. Feeling is therefore a very special way of thinking, a way of feeling-thinking, as the Portuguese poet Fernando Pessoa said, a way of a beating-paralysing, screaming-being mute simultaneity. To feel is to contradict not by incoherence or ignorance but because to feel means to be exposed to the obscurity of light and to the light of obscurity. The German word to say feeling, Gefühl, brings in the prefix Ge the dimension of the complexity of every feeling. Feeling never feels one, but always the lively multiplicity of the one. Scheler implicitly confirms the Heracletian words that life is "the one in itself distinct" hen diaféro heautō.

Pain cannot be thought and obliges us to think. Accordingly to Scheler, this paradox of pain can only be understood in the light of the idea of sacrifice. Sacrifice takes place from within the experience of the exposed life. This means that the experience of pain and joy is in fact the disclosure of pain as pain and joy as joy. This means that not everything that we call pain and joy is pain and joy. Scheler indicates that the difficulty in developing a phenomenology of pain, suffering and death is not mainly due to the metaphysical heritage of philosophy. Scheler considers that the great difficulty is due to what he called the "age of the world of indifference," die Zeitalter des Ausgleichen. The difficulty lies in the indifference to the events of the world. This world is one where indifference produces a technology of
compassion. Pain and death are always the pain and death of others. When pain and death get near to "me", showing themselves in the imminence of becoming "mine," indifference seeks all possible and subtle techniques to transform pain and death to something other than pain and death. In the age of indifference, man suffers by suffering. The age of indifference and an indifferent world can be defined as the age of such a civilized world that the more we strive to tear up pain by its roots the more we create pain and profound suffering, in Scheler’s own words. *Ut mors mortem sic superaret,* surpassing death by death, as is sung in some liturgies. The more we try to eradicate pain, the more painful pain is, and the more painful the experience becomes. That is why in the age of the world of indifference we have to avoid all experience in order to avoid all pain.

The greatest danger to humanity in the age of indifference is not the danger of a total extermination of life. The greatest danger is to be anaesthetized by indifference by which we suffer compassion for the pain of the other in order to avoid encountering the pain of discovering otherness in oneself, being the facticity of one’s own destiny. The pain of a non lonely birth and a lonely death is the pain of transforming oneself by pain. This transformation consists of abandoning the subsistence in the self in order to give oneself to becoming another. Scheler observed many times in the Nietzschean mood that feeling compassion (*Mitleid*) is not difficult. But it is difficult to feel joint-joy (*Mitfräude*). It is possible to read in Scheler’s claim that only in joint-joy can indifferent compassion be transformed into the passion of belonging and in this way into the realization of solidarity.

Scheler’s starting point is that the only possibility of thinking pain and suffering is to deny the denial of evil, to resist the resistance to evil. In which sense should pain and suffering touch joy? How is it possible that a thought does not betray joy? What does the exposed life mean? All those questions are gifts from Scheler’s text. A possible way towards an answer to those questions is one of Rilke’s *Sonett to Orpheus* that we can keep in mind, not to conclude our reflection on the sense and significance of pain and suffering but to invite further thoughts:

*What experience was worst for you?*
*What is the deepest loss that you have suffered?*
*If drinking is bitter, change yourself to wine.*
*In this immeasurable darkness, be the power that rounds your senses in their magic ring, the sense of their magic encounter.*

*And if the earthly no longer knows your name,*
whisper to the silent earth: I'm flowing.
To the flashing water say: I am.

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NOTES

1 The strophe sings as following:
'This Zeus alone who shows the perfect way
Of knowledge: He hath ruled.
Men shall learn wisdom, by affliction schooled.

In visions of the night, like dropping rain,
Descend the many memories of pain
Before the spirit's sight: through tears and dole
Comes wisdom o'er the unwilling soul-
A boon, I wot, of all Divinity,
That holds its sacred throne in strength, above the sky!

2 "Der Anhaltspunkt für unseren Satz: Widerstand gegen die Übel ist Ursprung und Grund der Steigerung des Schmerzes”.

3 In the same sense of Husserl when he states on Logische Untersuchungen BD 2, V, §1 Vieldeutigkeit des Terminus Bewusstsein.

4 Accordingly to Scheler there are different layers of profundity of feeling: a) the feelings related to sensations; b) the feelings related to the body and to life, the so called vital feelings; c) the feelings related to the soul, that is related to the consciousness of I-myself; d) the pure spiritual feelings.

5 As pain of growth or birth is pain a movement and not a state. Pain is pain-from and pain-toward. Pain exposes itself in the vital-mortal experience of a passing-to, after it began to pass and before it has come over to a new state. As pain of growth and pain, pain is the pain of transition within a transition. Scheler does not develop this point but he gives signs in this direction. Following this sign given by Scheler we can discover that the genealogy of the concepts of part and whole, of kinds and species, genos and eidos is to be found in the specific spatiality and temporality of a transition.

REFERENCES